Abstract Recently, opacity has proved a promising technique for describing security properties. Much of the work has been couched in terms of Petri nets. Here, we extend the notion of opacity to the model of labelled transition systems and generalise opacity in order to better represent concepts from the literature on information flow. In particular, we establish links between opacity and the information flow concepts of anonymity and non-inference. We also investigate ways of verifying opacity when working with Petri nets. Our work is illustrated by two examples, one describing anonymity in a commercial context, and the other modelling requirements upon a simple voting system.
Introduction
The notion of secrecy has been formulated in various ways in the computer security literature. However, two views of security have been developed over the years by two separate communities. The first one starts from the notion of information flow, describing the knowledge an intruder could gain in terms of properties such as non-deducibility or noninterference. The second view was initiated by Dolev and Yao's work and focussed initially on security properties. The idea here is to describe properly the capability of the intruder. Some variants of secrecy appeared, such as strong secrecy, giving more expressivity than the security property but still lacking the expressivity of information flow concepts.
Recently, opacity has been shown to be a promising technique for describing and unifying security properties. The essential idea is that a predicate is opaque if an observer of the system will never be able to determine the truth of that predicate. Early work was couched in terms of Petri nets. In this paper, we extend the notion of opacity to the more general framework of labelled transition systems. When using opacity we have fine-grained control over the observation capabilities of the players, and we show one way that these capabilities may be encoded.
In the first section, after recalling some basic definitions, we present a generalisation of opacity, and show how this specialises into the three previously defined variants: initial opacity, final opacity and total opacity. In Sect. 3, we show how opacity is related to previous work in security. We consider how opacity may describe anonymity and noninterference (in particular a restriction called non-inference), and discuss it in the context of security protocols. In Sect. 4, we consider the question of opacity checking, and state a general undecidability result for opacity. After restricting ourselves to Petri nets, we give some decidability and undecidability properties. As opacity is undecidable as soon as we consider systems with infinite number of states, we present an approximation technique which may provide a way of model checking even in such cases. Finally, in Sect. 5, we conclude with two examples. The first, drawn from the commercial world, illustrates how anonymity may be expressed using opacity. The second considers a voting scheme, and shows how the approximation technique might be used.
The contributions of this paper are therefore: we present a general theory of opacity in the context of labelled transition systems, which allows us to compare our work with other work in the security community, and also unify the work already done with opacity. We also prove a number of (un)decidability results, and present a technique which may allow model checking even though the problem at hand is in general undecidable.
Basic formal notations
Sequences. The set of finite sequences over a set A will be denoted by A * , and the empty sequence by . The length n of a finite sequence λ = l 1 . . . l n will be denoted by len(λ). The projection of λ onto a set B ⊆ A, denoted by λ| B , is formed by stripping from λ all the elements that are not in B.
The concatenation of sequences λ 1 , . . . , λ n will be denoted by λ 1 · · · λ n or λ 1 • · · · • λ n .
Multisets.
A multiset over a set X is a map θ : X → N. Multiset addition and subtraction are defined so that, for all x ∈ X :
Moreover, θ ≤ θ if θ(x) ≤ θ (x), for all x ∈ X , and multiplying θ by n ∈ N is defined by (n · θ)(x) df = n · θ(x), for all x ∈ X . A multiset may be specified by explicitly listing its members. For example, {a, a, b} denotes a multiset θ such that θ(a) = 2, θ(b) = 1 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Labelled transition systems.
The main part of our discussion will be carried out within a general framework into which one can easily map, for example, concurrent automata, process algebras and logic formalisms. A labelled transition system is a tuple
where S is the (potentially infinite) set of states, L is the (potentially infinite) set of labels, ⊆ S × L × S is the transition relation, and S 0 is the nonempty (finite) set of initial states. We consider only deterministic labelled transition systems, and so for any transitions (s, l, s ), (s, l, s ) ∈ , it is the case that s = s .
A run of the labelled transition system is a pair (s 0 , λ), where s 0 ∈ S 0 and λ = l 1 . . . l n (n ≥ 0) is a finite sequence of labels such that there are states s 1 , . . . , s n satisfying (s i−1 , l i , s i ), for i = 1, . . . , n. We will denote the state s n by s 0 ⊕λ and call it reachable from s. Note that s 0 ⊕λ is well-defined since lts is deterministic, and that s 0 ⊕ = s 0 .
The set of all runs is denoted by run(lts), and the language generated by lts is defined as
Observability and opacity
In this section, we present definitions of the key notions and concepts used throughout the paper.
Let lts df = (S, L , , S 0 ) be a labelled transition system, and Obs be a set of elements called observables fixed for the rest of this section. We also denote Obs df = Obs ∪ { }. We will now aim at modelling the different capabilities for observing the system modelled by lts. First, we introduce a general observation function and then specialise it to reflect limited information about runs available to an observer.
Definition 1 Any function obs
where respectively the following hold:
In each of the above cases, we may use obs(λ) to denote obs(s, λ).
Allowing obs to return allows one to model invisible actions. The different kinds of observable functions reflect different computational power of the observers. Static functions correspond to an observer which always interprets the same executed label in the same way. Dynamic functions correspond to an observer which has potentially infinite memory to store labels, but can only use knowledge of previous labels to interpret the current label (and no re-interpretation is then possible). Orwellian functions correspond to an observer which has potentially infinite memory to store labels, and can use knowledge (either subsequent or previous) of other labels to (re-)interpret a label. m-orwellian functions are a restricted version of the last class where the observer can store only a bounded number of labels. Static functions are nothing but 1-orwellian ones (since then κ i = l i ); they are also a special case of dynamic functions. Both dynamic and m-orwellian functions are a special case of orwellian functions.
Let us consider an observation function obs. We are interested in whether an observer can establish a property prop (a predicate over system runs) for some run having only access to the result of the observation function. We will identify prop with its characteristic set: the set of runs for which it holds. Now, given an observed execution of the system, we would want to find out whether the fact that the underlying run belongs to prop can be deduced by the observer. (Note that we are not interested in establishing whether the underlying run does not belong to prop; to do this, we would rather consider the property prop df = run(lts)\prop.) What it means to deduce a property can mean different things depending on what is relevant or important from the point of view of real application. Below, we give a general formalisation of opacity and then specialise it in three different ways.
Definition 2
Let obs be an observation function and prop a predicate prop over run(lts). Then prop is opaque w.r.t. obs if, for every run (s, λ) ∈ prop, there is a run (s , λ ) / ∈ prop such that obs(s, λ) = obs(s , λ ). In other words,
Moreover, prop is called initial-opaque / final-opaque / totalopaque if there is a predicate prop such that for every run
In the first of the above cases, we may use s ∈ prop to denote (s, λ) ∈ prop.
Initial-opacity has been illustrated by the dining cryptographers example (in [6] with two cryptographers and in [5] with three). It would appear that it is suited to modelling situations in which initialisation information such as crypto keys, etc., needs to be kept secret. More generally, situations in which confidential information can be modelled in terms of initially resolved non-determinism can be captured in this way. Final-opacity models situations where the final result of a computation needs to be secret. Total-opacity is a generalisation of the two other properties asking not only the result of the computation and its parameters to be secret but also the states visited during computation. We end this section making two comments. First, we assumed that our labelled transition systems are all deterministic. This is not restrictive since what really matters is the way an observation function is defined, and transition labels are only a convenient device for defining such a function. Second, it is possible to consider state-based observation functions. For example, a state-based static observation function obs is one for which there is a mapping obs : S → Obs such that for every run (s, λ)
Opacity in security
In this section we show how our notion of opacity relates to other concepts commonly used in the formal treatment of security. We compare opacity to some forms of anonymity and non-inference, as well as discuss its application to security protocols.
Anonymity
In this section, lts = (S, L , , S 0 ) is a fixed labelled transition system and A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } (n ≥ 2) a set of labels of L over which anonymity is being considered. Moreover, α, α 1 , . . . , α n are labels not belonging to L.
We restrict our attention to the style of anonymity definitions given in [30] . Here, anonymity over some set is expressed as the invariance of an appropriate projection of the system (corresponding to an appropriate observation function) under permutations of the anonymity set.
Intuitively, strong anonymity corresponds to invariance under dynamic permutations, that can change arbitrarily throughout a run. Weak anonymity, by contrast calls only for invariance under static permutations, i.e. the same permutation is applied throughout a run. Weak anonymity thus corresponds to the notion of pseudo-anonymity: the observer can tell when actions are performed by the same agent without knowing which agent. We do not attempt here to encode other notions of anonymity such as unlinkability [16] .
Note that anonymity is thus a function of the behaviour of the underlying (anonymising) system, as well as being dependent on the capability of the observer.
The various forms of observation function model different strengths of observer. We now introduce two observation functions which render anonymity in terms of suitable opacity properties.
The first function, obs str , is static and defined so that obs str (λ) is obtained from λ ∈ L * by replacing each occurrence of a i ∈ A by α. The second observation function, obs weak , is dynamic and defined as follows. Let a i 1 , . . . , a i q (q ≥ 0) be all the distinct labels of A appearing within λ ∈ L * listed in the (unique) order in which they appeared for the first time in λ; then obs weak (λ) is obtained from λ by replacing each occurrence of a i j by α j . For example, assuming that A = {a, b}, we have:
An A-permutation is a map π : L * → L * such that π is a permutation on the set of anonymised labels A and identity on the remaining labels in L, and π(λ
for all λ and λ in L * . It is easy to see that obs weak is invariant over any A-permutation π , i.e., obs weak = obs weak • π .
Strong O-anonymity
In [30] , a definition of strong anonymity is presented for the process algebra CSP. With minor syntactic changes, we reproduce the definition below.
Definition 3 lts is strongly anonymous if
obs str (λ) = obs str (λ )}.
In other words, one can always observe that some anonymised label has been executed, but the identity of this label is completely protected. To render the above definition in opacity terms, we need to ensure that whenever a sequence λ can be generated by the labelled transition system, then an arbitrary replacement of the anonymised letters in λ by other labels in A results in a valid run of the labelled transition system. In other words, by taking any sequence µ of labels of the same length as λ| A , and replacing the ith occurrence of an anonymised label within λ by the ith label in µ, the result λ µ is a sequence generated by the labelled transition system. The desired effect is achieved in the next definition, where the opacity of the predicate prop µ ensures that the sequence λ µ is a possible history of the labelled transition system, because it is the only sequence for which the predicate prop µ is false, and so prop µ can only be opaque if λ µ is a possible sequence. Definition 4 lts is strongly O-anonymous if, for every sequence µ ∈ A * , the predicate prop µ over the runs of lts given by
is opaque w.r.t. the observation function obs str .
Theorem 1 lts is strongly anonymous iff it is strongly Oanonymous.
Proof ( ⇒) Assume lts is strongly anonymous. We need to show that, for every µ ∈ A * , prop µ is opaque w.r.t. obs str .
Suppose (s, λ) is a run of lts which belongs to prop µ . Choose λ such that λ | A = µ and obs str (λ) = obs str (λ ).
Then len(λ| A ) = len(µ) and λ| A = µ. In turn, this implies that µ = , and so len(λ| A ) ≥ 1. By strong anonymity, (s , λ ) is in lts, and so (s , λ ) does not belong to prop µ . Hence prop µ is opaque w.r.t. obs str .
(⇐ ) Assume lts is strongly O-anonymous. As the (⊆) inclusion in Definition 3 is obvious, we only show the (⊇) inclusion. Suppose λ ∈ L * and λ ∈ L(lts) are such that obs str (λ) = obs str (λ ). What we need to show is that λ ∈ L(lts). Clearly, if λ = λ then there is nothing to prove, so assume that λ = λ which, due to obs str (λ) = obs str (λ ),
Let µ df = λ| A , and let (s , λ ) be any run of lts generating λ . We have that (s , λ ) belongs to prop µ , and so, by the definition of strong O-anonymity, there is a run (s , λ ) of lts not belonging to prop µ such that obs str (λ ) = obs str (λ ). It is now easy to check that λ | A = µ. Hence λ = λ, and so λ ∈ L(lts).
Weak O-anonymity
A natural extension of strong anonymity is weak anonymity. 1 This corresponds quite naturally to the notion of pseudoanonymity: actions performed by the same party can be correlated, but the identity of the party cannot be determined. This construction is able, for example, to model the anonymity provided by electronic bulletin boards which allow contributors to choose a username. Other users may correlate entries by a contributor, but the identity of the contributor is not revealed.
Definition 5 lts is weakly anonymous if
A suitable rendering of weak anonymity within the opacity framework is a straightforward adaptation of the previous definition.
Definition 6 lts is weakly O-anonymous if, for every sequence µ ∈ A * , the predicate prop µ over the runs of lts introduced in Definition 4 is opaque w.r.t. obs weak .
Theorem 2 lts is weakly anonymous iff it is weakly O-anonymous.
Proof Similar to that of Theorem 1. Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to present strong and weak anonymity within our opacity framework, and lend confidence to our belief that opacity is a valuable concept with which to examine flavours of security problems.
Other observation functions
Dynamic observation functions can model, for example, the downgrading of a channel. Before the downgrade nothing sensitive can be seen, after the downgrade the observer is allowed to see all subsequent transmissions on that channel. A suitable formulation would be as follows.
Suppose that A represents the set of all possible messages on a confidential channel, and δ not in A represents an action of downgrading that channel. Then obs downgrade (λ) is obtained from λ by deleting all occurrences of messages of A which are not preceded (directly or indirectly) by an occurrence of δ. In other words, if the downgrade action appears earlier in the run, then the messages on the channel are observed in the clear, otherwise nothing is observed.
Orwellian observation functions can model conditional or escrowed anonymity, where someone can be anonymous when they initially interact with the system, but some time in the future their identity can be revealed, as outlined below.
Suppose that there are n identities, id 1 , . . . , id n , each identity being capable of performing actions represented by a i ∈ A. Moreover, α / ∈ L represents the encrypted observation of any of these actions, and ρ i ∈ L \ A represents the action of identity id i being revealed. Then obs esc (λ) is obtained from λ by replacing each occurrence of a i by α, provided that ρ i never occurs within λ.
Non-inference
Opacity can be linked to a particular formulation of noninterference called non-inference. A discussion of noninterference can be found in [14, 34] . The basic idea is that labels are split into two sets, High and Low. The latter labels are visible by anyone, whereas the former labels are private. Then, a system is non-interfering if it is not possible for an outside observer to gain any knowledge about the presence of High labels in the original run (the observer only sees Low labels). Non-inference is a restriction of standard non-interference. It was originally called non-inference in [25] , and is called strong non-deterministic non-interference in [15] .
Definition 7 A labelled transition system lts satisfies noninference if L(lts)| Low ⊆ L(lts).
In other words, for any run (s, λ) of lts, there exists a run (s , λ ) such that λ is λ with all the labels in High removed.
The notion of non-interference (and in particular noninference) is close to opacity as stated by the two following properties. First, it is possible to transform certain initial opacity properties into non-inference properties.
Theorem 3 Any initial opacity property involving static observation function can be reduced to a non-inference property.
Proof Let lts = (S, L , , S 0 ) be a labelled transition system, obs defined through obs (see Definition 1) be a static observation function, and prop defined through prop (see Definition 2) be an initial opacity predicate.
We construct a new labelled transition system lts
is obtained from by replacing each (s, l, r ) ∈ by (s, obs (l), r ), and adding, for each s ∈ S 0 , a new transition (s , h, s).
We then consider a non-inference problem for lts with Low df = obs (L) and High df = {h}, and below we show that lts satisfies non-inference iff for lts the opacity property prop w.r.t. obs holds. We assume that lts is deterministic; otherwise we replace it by its deterministic version.
( ⇒) Suppose that (s, λ) ∈ run(lts) ∩ prop. Then (s , h obs(λ)) ∈ run(lts ). Thus, by non-inference of lts , there is (r, κ) ∈ run(lts ) such that obs(λ) = κ and r ∈ S 0 \ prop. Hence there is (r, µ) ∈ run(lts) such that obs(µ) = κ = obs(λ). Consequently, the opacity of prop w.r.t. obs holds.
(⇐ ) Suppose that (r, κ) ∈ run(lts ) and κ| Low = κ. Then κ = hρ and r = s , for some ρ and s ∈ S 0 ∩ prop. Hence there is (s, λ) ∈ run(lts) such that obs(λ) = ρ and, by the opacity of prop holding for obs, there is (r, ψ) ∈ run(lts) such that r / ∈ prop and obs(ψ) = obs(λ). In turn, this means that (r, obs(ψ)) ∈ run(lts ). We finally have κ| Low = ρ = obs(λ) = obs(ψ), and so lts satisfies noninference.
A kind of converse result also holds, in the sense that one can transform any non-inference property to a general opacity property.
Theorem 4 Any non-inference property in the sense of Definition 7 can be reduced to an opacity property with static observation function.
Proof Let lts = (S, High ∪ Low, , S 0 ) be a labelled transition system. We define prop as a predicate over run(lts) so that prop(s, λ) holds iff λ| Low = λ. Moreover, obs is defined as a static observation function such that obs(λ) = λ| Low . Below we show that lts satisfies non-inference iff for lts the opacity property prop w.r.t. obs holds.
( ⇒) Suppose that (s, λ) ∈ run(lts) ∩ prop. Then λ| Low = λ and so, by the non-inference of lts, there is a state s such that (s , λ| Low ) ∈ run(lts). Clearly, (s , λ| Low ) / ∈ prop and obs(s , λ| Low ) = obs(s, λ), since (λ| Low )| Low = λ| Low . As a result, the opacity of prop w.r.t. obs holds.
(⇐ ) Suppose that (s, λ) ∈ run(lts) and λ| Low = λ. Then (s, λ) ∈ run(lts) ∩ prop and so, by the opacity property prop w.r.t. obs, there is a run (s , λ ) in run(lts)\prop such that obs(λ) = obs(λ ). Thus we have λ | Low = λ and λ | Low = λ| Low . Hence λ| Low ∈ L(lts). As a result, lts satisfies non-inference.
Non-interference is a binary notion: any information flow from High to Low breaks the non-interference property. We believe that the ability to fine-tune the obs function may make opacity better suited to encoding partial information flow, where a message could provide some partial knowledge and it may take a collection of such leakages to move the system into a compromised state.
Security protocols
Opacity was first introduced in the context of security protocols in [22] . With one restriction (since we require the number of initial states to be finite, the initial choices made by the various honest agents must come from bounded sets) the current version of opacity is still applicable to protocols. We begin by recalling the original setting in which opacity was introduced in [22] .
Messages, deductions and protocols.
In what follows, we assume that keys is a countably infinite set of keys, and a signature keys ∪{pair, encrypt}, where pair and encrypt are binary functions and the keys are constant functions. Then a message is a first order term over such that the instances of encrypt only have keys as their second arguments. We will use m, m Each key k has an inverse, denoted by k −1 . This is suitable for both symmetric key cryptography with k −1 = k and public key cryptography with k −1 = k. The notation E m, where m is a message and E is a finite set of messages (also called an environment), comes from Dolev-Yao theory [9] and denotes the fact that m is deducible from E. This deduction relation is defined through the following inference rules:
Note that we do not consider composition inferences but only the decomposition ones. For in order to define the similarity on messages below, the deduction relation only needs to be defined on keys, and so considering compositions is not necessary.
In [22] , a simple model of protocol is given as well as its semantics. Using this semantics in the case of a passive adversary, protocols can be seen as (deterministic) labelled transition system where labels are messages. This transformation is detailed in [20, 22] .
For the sake of simplicity, we here define a protocol as a labelled transition system lts = (S, L , , S 0 ) , where L is the set of all messages, S represents the possible internal states of the different agents that are involved in the protocol, and S 0 represents the possible initial states of such agents. As before, a property of a protocol is a set of its runs.
Message similarity and opacity. Two messages, m and m , are similar for two environments, E and E , denoted
if this can be derived from the following inference rules:
In other words, messages are similar if it is impossible for an intruder to distinguish between them using the knowledge contained in E and E . A closely related notion was introduced in [2] , where it was shown to be sound in the computational model, and its generalisation including the case of equational theories appears in [1] .
We are now ready to introduce opacity in a similar way as in [22] . Relationship with orwellian opacity. To state which part of a message is visible from the outside, we will use the notion of a pattern [2] , which employs a distinct atomic message , representing messages which cannot be decrypted. Then patt(m, E) is the accessible skeleton of m using messages in E as the knowledge. It is defined recursively as:
otherwise.
The main property of patterns is that similarity corresponds to pattern equality.
Proposition 2
Let E and E be two environments, and m and m be two messages. Then:
Proof The left-to-right implication can be shown by induction on the proof structure of E, E m ∼ m , and the converse one by induction on the structure of patt(m, E).
We consider an orwellian observation function obs orw such that, for every sequence λ = m 1 . . . m n of messages
Then the opacity of prop w.r.t. obs orw and the π -opacity are equivalent. 
Theorem 5
Thus, by Proposition 2, for i = 1, . . . , n:
Hence prop is opaque w.r.t. obs orw . In a similar way, we obtain that also ¬prop is opaque w.r.t. obs orw .
Assume next that prop and ¬prop are opaque w.r.t. obs orw , and that (s, m 1 . . . m n ) ∈ run(lts).
If (s, m 1 , . . . , m n ) belongs to prop then, by the opacity of prop, there exists (s , q 1 . . . q n ) in run(lts)\prop which produces the same result through obs orw . Thus, by Proposition 2, for i = 1, . . . , n:
We also have that (s, m 1 . . . m n ) is in prop and, for i = 1, . . . , n:
Hence prop is π -opaque.
If (s, m 1 . . . m n ) is not in prop then, by the opacity of ¬prop, there exists (s , p 1 . . . p n ) ∈ run(lts)∩prop which produces the same result through obs orw . Thus, by Proposition 2, for i = 1, . . . , n:
We also have that (s, m 1 , . . . , m n ) is not in prop and, for i = 1, . . . , n:
Hence again prop is π -opaque.
Note that as protocols are commonly designed to satisfy initial opacity (opacity w.r.t. the value of one of the parameters, e.g., a vote's value), the predicate prop can be represented as a suitable subset of S 0 .
Opacity checking
Opacity is a very general concept and so unsurprisingly many of its instances are undecidable. This remains true even for some classes of finite labelled transition systems. We will formulate such a property as Theorem 6(4), but first we state a general non-decidability result.
Proposition 3 Opacity is undecidable.
Proof We will show that the reachability problem for Turing machines is reducible to (final) opacity. Let tm be a Turing machine and s be its (non-initial) state. We construct an instance of the final opacity as follows: lts is given by the operational semantics of tm, the observation function obs is constant, and prop returns true iff the final state of a run is different from s. Since s is reachable in tm iff prop is final opaque w.r.t. obs, opacity is undecidable.
What is more, from the proof of the above proposition it follows that the undecidability of the reachability problem for a class of machines generating labelled transition systems renders opacity undecidable. We will therefore restrict ourselves to Petri nets, a rich model of computation in which the reachability problem is still decidable [29] . Furthermore, Petri nets are well-studied structures and there is a wide range of tools and algorithms for their verification.
Petri nets
We will use Petri nets with weighted arcs [29] , and give their operational semantics in terms of transition sequences. 2 Note that this varies slightly from the one used in [6] where the step sequence semantics allowed multiple transitions to occur simultaneously. Here, transitions are clearly separated.
A (weighted) net is a triple N df = (P, T, W ) such that P and T are disjoint finite sets, and
The elements of P and T are respectively the places and transitions, and W is the weight function of N. In diagrams, places are drawn as circles, and transitions as rectangles. If W (x, y) ≥ 1 for some (x, y) ∈ (T × P) ∪ (P × T ), then (x, y) is an arc leading from x to y. As usual, arcs are annotated with their weight if this is 2 or more. The pre-and post-multiset of a transition t ∈ T are multisets of places, pre N (t) and post N (t), respectively given by
for all p ∈ P. A marking of a net N is a multiset of places. Following the standard terminology, given a marking M of N and a place p ∈ P, we say that p is marked if M( p) ≥ 1 and that M( p) is the number of tokens in p. In diagrams, M is represented by drawing in each place p exactly M( p) tokens (black dots).
Transitions represent actions which may occur at a given marking and then lead to a new marking. A transition t is enabled at a marking M if pre N (t) ≤ M. Thus, in order for t to be enabled at M, for each place p, the number of tokens in p under M should at least be equal to the total number of tokens that are needed as an input to t, respecting the weights of the input arcs. If t is enabled at M, then it can be executed leading to the marking
This means that the execution of t "consumes" from each place p exactly W ( p, t) tokens and "produces" in each place p exactly W (t, p) tokens. If the execution of t leads from M to M we write M[t M . We call a marking M reachable from marking M if M = M or if there exist transitions t 1 , . . . , t n and markings M 1 , . . . , M n−1 (n ≥ 1) such that:
A marked Petri net pn where S is the set of all the markings reachable from the markings in S 0 , T is the set of labels, and is defined by
The language of pn is that of lts pn .
In the case of Petri nets, there are still some undecidable opacity problems. Proof Below we reduce three undecidable problems to suitable variants of opacity, in each case defining a marked Petri net pn as well as observation function obs and opacity predicate prop for the runs of lts pn . The first two problems are related to Petri nets: the language inclusion problem [21] , and the reachable markings inclusion problem [27] . The third one is the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP).
, for i = 1, 2, be two marked Petri nets such that each transition has at least one incoming arc. We first construct their (disjoint) isomorphic copies
, in such a way that each transition or place x in pn i is renamed to (x, i) in pn i , and
-obs is static and given by obs (t, i)
-prop is true iff the first marking of a run is M 1 .
Since the language of pn 1 is included in that of pn 2 iff prop is initial opaque w.r.t. obs, part (1) holds.
(2) Let pn i = (N i , {M i }), for i = 1, 2, and pn be the three marked Petri nets as in the proof of part (1). Then: -We modify pn in such a way that each transition (t, i) is replaced by two identically connected copies, (t , i) and (t , i). We then add to pn three fresh places, p , p and p , and two fresh transitions, u and u , in such a way that their arcs are as follows:
for each transition (t, i) of pn. Next, to obtain the initial markings, we add a single copy of p to both M 1 and M 2 .
-obs is state-oriented observation function which is given by obs (M) Since the set of reachable markings of pn 1 is included in that of pn 2 iff prop is initial opaque w.r.t. obs, part (2) }, {(a 1 , 1), (b 1 , 1), . . . , (a n , n), (b n , n)}, W ) and the initial markings S 0 df = {{s}, {s }}, with the arcs given by Since the instance of PCP has a solution iff prop is opaque w.r.t. obs, part (4) holds.
A look at the proof of the last result identifies two sources for the complexity of the opacity problem. The first one is the complexity of the studied property, captured through the definition of prop. In particular, the latter may be used to encode undecidable problems and so in practice one should presumably restrict the interest to relatively straightforward versions of opacity, such as the initial opacity. The second source is the complexity of the observation function, and it is presumably reasonable to restrict the interest to some simple classes of observation functions, such as the static observation functions.
What now follows is a key result stating that initial opacity with an m-orwellian observation function is decidable provided that the labelled transition system generated by a marked Petri net is finite. 3 In fact, this result holds for any finite labelled transition system.
Theorem 7
In the case of a finite labelled transition system, initial opacity w.r.t. an m-orwellian observation function is decidable.
Proof The result was shown in [6] using regular language inclusion for m = 1. Here, we will re-use this result after reducing the case of m = 2 to that of m = 1 (the proposed reduction can easily be extended to any m > 2).
Let lts = (S, L , , S 0 ) be a finite labelled transition system, for which a 2-orwellian observation function obs, and initial opacity predicate prop, are given. We define a labelled transition system lts df = (S , L , , S 0 ) together with a static observation function obs and initial opacity predicate prop for the runs of lts , as follows.
-S comprises all triples (α, s, β) such that s ∈ S and one of the following holds:
-α is the label of an arc incoming to s and β is the label of an arc outgoing from s. -α is the label of an arc incoming to s and β = .
-s ∈ S 0 , α = and β is the label of an arc outgoing from s.
Moreover, the triples from the third case form S 0 .
-prop is true for (α, s, β) ∈ S 0 iff prop was true for s.
We then observe that prop is opaque w.r.t. obs iff prop is opaque w.r.t. obs . Hence, since lts is finite, prop is opaque w.r.t. obs.
Approximation of opacity
As initial opacity is, in general, undecidable when labelled transition systems are allowed to be infinite, we propose in this section a technique which might allow to verify it, at least in some cases, using a technique close to abstract interpretation [7, 8] . It uses an abstraction of opacity called under/overopacity.
Definition 9
Let lts, lts and lts be labelled transition systems. Moreover, let obs, obs and obs be observation functions and prop, prop and prop predicates for the runs of, respectively, lts, lts and lts. Then prop is under/overopaque (or simply uo-opaque) w.r.t. obs if the following hold:
obs(run(lts)∩prop) ⊆ obs(run(lts)∩prop) ( †) obs(run(lts)∩prop) ⊆ obs(run(lts)\prop) obs(run(lts)\prop) ⊆ obs(run(lts)\prop) ( ‡).
Intuitively, lts provides an over-approximation of the runs satisfying prop, while lts provides an under-approximation of those runs that do not satisfy prop. The whole point is that by a judicious choice of such approximations one can replace the complex task of proving the original opacity problem by much simpler proofs of the three inclusions in Definition 9.
Proposition 4 Uo-opacity implies opacity w.r.t. obs.
Proof Follows directly from Definition 9 and the transitivity of set inclusion.
Given lts, obs and prop, the idea then is to be able to construct an over-approximation and under-approximation to satisfy the last definition. A possible way of doing this in the case of marked Petri nets is described after outlining the construction of the coverability graph of a Petri net.
Coverability graphs. Coverability graphs (see [13] for details) are commonly used to analyse unbounded Petri nets (i.e., Petri nets that may have infinitely many reachable markings). These graphs are used to approximate potentially infinite labelled transition systems generated by Petri nets with finite state automata. But instead of using markings for their nodes, coverability graphs use ω-markings, where places can be assigned the value ω to indicate an unbounded number of tokens. 4 Consuming or producing tokens from/to ω-place always leads to ω, and the comparison of markings is lifted to ω-markings by assuming that n ≤ ω, for all n ∈ N. We then say that an ω-marking Q covers ω-marking Q if Q ≤ Q. The notions of transition enabledness and execution are the same as before.
To explain the standard definition of the coverability graph cg pn and its construction, we take a marked Petri net with a single initial marking, pn = (N , {M 0 }). The states of its coverability graph cg pn are ω-markings, and it is built by starting from the marking M 0 and performing the usual depth-first exploration, labelling newly generated arcs with the executed Petri net transitions. Crucially, at each visited ω-marking Q, one checks whether there exists an already generated Q different from Q such that Q ≤ Q and there is a path from Q to Q. If so, we take ω-marking Q such that Q ( p)
The full details of the coverability graph construction are not relevant from the point of view of our subsequent discussion. What matters are some properties of the resulting cg pn which we give below:
-cg pn is finite.
-If M is a reachable (initial) marking of pn, then there is a (resp. initial) ω-marking Q in cg pn which covers M. -If M is a reachable marking of pn and M[t M and Q is an ω-marking in cg pn covering M, then there is a transition (Q, t, Q ) in cg pn such that Q covers M .
Uo-opacity for Petri nets
Suppose that pn = (N , S 0 ) is a marked Petri net, lts = lts pn , obs is a static observation function for lts and prop ⊆ S 0 is an initial opacity predicate for lts.
Deriving over-approximation. For a Petri net, an overapproximation lts can obtained by generating the coverability graph cg pn of pn starting from the initial nodes in S 0 ∩ prop. The only modification to the original coverability graph algorithm is that in our setup there may be several starting nodes S 0 ∩ prop rather than just one. However, this is a small technical detail. The observation function obs is static and defined in the same way as obs. The predicate prop is true for all the initial nodes of lts. As already explained, lts is always a finite labelled transition system and, as the next result shows, it always provides an over-approximation.
Proposition 5 The inclusion ( †) holds.
Proof It suffices to show run(lts) ∩ prop ⊆ L(lts) which, in turn, will follow from the property we prove below. Suppose that (M 0 , λ) ∈ run(lts) ∩ prop. Then there is (Q 0 , λ) ∈ run(lts) such that M 0 ⊕λ is covered by Q 0 ⊕λ. We will show the result by induction on the length of λ.
In the base case, λ = . By one of the properties of coverability graphs, there is an initial state Q 0 of lts which covers M 0 , and we are done.
In the induction step, we assume that the property is satisfied for (M 0 , λ) ∈ run(lts)∩prop and then take (M 0 , λt) ∈ run(lts). By the induction hypothesis, there is (Q 0 , λ) ∈ run(lts) such that M 0 ⊕λ is covered by Q 0 ⊕λ. Hence, by one of the properties of coverability graphs, there is a transition (Q 0 ⊕λ, t, Q) in lts such that Q covers M 0 ⊕λt.
Deriving under-approximation. A straightforward way of finding an under-approximation is to impose a maximal finite capacity max for the places of pn (i.e., the transition enabling rule is modified by adding the restriction that the marking M resulting from its execution must satisfy M( p) ≤ max, for all places p), and then deriving the labelled transition system lts assuming that the initial markings are those in S 0 \prop. The observation function obs is then defined in the same way as obs, and the predicate prop is false for all the initial nodes.
The labelled transition system lts resulting from imposing the bound max is always a finite. However, for some Petri nets with infinite reachability graph (as shown in the next section), this under-approximation may be too restrictive, even if one takes arbitrarily large max. Then, in addition to using instance specific techniques, one may attempt to derive more generous under-approximation following an approach described next.
We now assume that there are some (intuitively, invisible) transitions in pn mapped by obs to . The basic idea is to propagate the information that a place can become unbounded due to infinite sequence of invisible transitions. The construction resembles to some extent that of coverability graph.
As in the case of coverability graph generation, the states of lts are ω-markings, and the graph is built through a depthfirst exploration starting from the initial states S 0 \prop. The essential part of the algorithm is an additional processing applied to a newly generated ω-marking Q. Before amending the generated graph, we first attempt to find 5 a sequence ξ of invisible transitions the execution of which leads to ω-marking Q = Q which covers Q. 6 If this is the case then we create an ω-marking
otherwise. Then Q ξ is used as a state of lts instead of Q. In particular, if Q ξ has not been generated yet, we execute from it each enabled transition t creating a new arc labelled by t. If the search for ξ was unsuccessful, the algorithm accepts Q as a new state of lts.
In general, lts is not guaranteed to be finite. However, the above algorithm may be combined with the capacity based approach (where the bound max is not applied to the ω values) and then it always produces a finite lts.
Proposition 6 The inclusion ( ‡) holds.
Proof It suffices to show obs(L(lts)) ⊆ obs(L(lts)) which, in turn, will follow from the property we prove below.
Suppose that Deciding uo-opacity Assuming that we have successfully generated over-and under-approximations lts and lts, uo-opacity holds iff
And the latter problem is decidable whenever lts and lts are finite labelled transition systems as it then reduces to that of inclusion of two regular languages.
Examples
To illustrate our work, we give two examples. The first one is inspired by an anonymity requirement required in the chemical industry. The second describes a simple voting system. Figure 1 is a Petri net representation of a scenario in the chemical industry. It is adapted from an example presented in [26] . In the example, a chemical development company A asks company B (transition a 1 ) to prepare a feasibility study into the development of a new chemical. When this is completed (transition b 1 ) company A is informed of the conclusions (transition a 2 ). On the basis of these conclusions company A decides to commission a chemical safety report, from either company C (transition a 3 ) or company C (transition a 3 ). The relevant law allows the chosen company to question company B on aspects of the feasibility study. However, the chosen company is not allowed to reveal its identity to company B, in order to protect the integrity of B's answers. In our example, there are only two possible companies, C and C , so our intention is that from B's point of view, the visible interactions do not reveal the identity of the chosen company. We may assume that the actions a 3 , a 3 , a 4 and a 4 are not visible to B, as these actions concern only companies A, C and C .
A scenario from chemical engineering
We choose the (static) observation function of B to be the identity function, except for
We now demonstrate the set of transitions {c 1 , c 1 } to be O-anonymous. If λ = l i . . . l n , the properties that we require to be opaque w.r.t. obs are: 
are identical. The properties prop and prop are therefore opaque, and the set {c 1 , c 1 } is strongly anonymous w.r.t. obs.
A simple voting scheme
In this example, we consider a vote session allowing only two votes: 1 and 2. We then describe a simple voting scheme in the form of a Petri net (see Fig. 2 and Res2 so this scheme does not ensure that every vote is counted. We want to verify that the vote cast by A is secret: the two possible initial markings are {Vote, 1} and {Vote, 2}. We prove that it is impossible to detect that "1" was marked (a symmetric argument would show that it is impossible to detect whether "2" was marked). The observation function is static and only transitions C1 and C2 are visible, i.e., obs (C1) = C1, obs(C2) = C2 and obs(t) = for any other transition t. The property to be checked is prop = {{Vote, 1}}.
To verify opacity of prop, we will use the under/overapproximation method. The coverability graph (overapproximation) of 26 nodes in total has been computed by Tina [31] and, after application of the observation function and simplification, we obtained that
where lts is defined as in Sect. 4.2.
The simple under-approximation using bounded capacity places will not work in this case, as for any chosen maximal capacity max, the language L(lts) will be finite whereas obs(L(lts)) is infinite. Thus, we use the second underapproximation technique. Table 1 represents the reachable states of the underapproximating labelled transition system lts starting from marking {Vote, 2} using this technique (using the notation introduced in Sect. 4.2, Q 0 = {Vote, 2} ξ for ξ = N V N V V 1 V 2.
The behaviour of lts, i.e., obs(L(lts)), is simple and given in Fig. 3 . Thus, the under-approximation is in this case 
Fig. 3
Under-approximation for the voting system obs(L(lts)) = {C1, C2} * , and so
obs(L(lts)) ⊆ obs(L(lts))
holds. We can now conclude that opacity of prop w.r.t. obs is verified and so the vote cast by A is kept secret.
Related work
Concepts similar to opacity have been studied using epistemic logics, or logics of knowledge [12] . These logics include a "knowledge" operator, representing the case where an agent knows a fact, and are particularly suitable for reasoning about security within a multi-agent context [4, 17, 23] . The semantics can be given within a "possible worlds" model: an agent knows a fact in a given world if it is true in every world that the agent considers possible. Opacity appears to be closely related to this knowledge operator, in that a property is opaque when the observer cannot be sure that it is true (see also below). That is, there is a world (a high level trace) that the observer considers possible, in which the fact does not hold. In [32] the notion of ignorance is developed, where an agent is ignorant of a fact prop when it cannot say for certain either that prop holds or that ¬prop holds. In our terms, an agent would be ignorant of prop if both prop and ¬prop were opaque. The enforcement of the opacity of a system under supervisory control has been explored in [3] , where it is shown that there is an optimal control for maintaining the secrecy of the system in the presence of observers aware of this control.
In [10] and [18] properties of opacity in a timed process algebra framework are discussed, and in [11] opacity is used in the context of systems performing long-running transactions, where the attacker can both observe and abort transactions.
Finally, there is a clear and strong relationship between our work and that contained in [19] , and through it also with that in [12] . Such a link had been pointed out to us on occasion, and the appendix contains its detailed discussion for the perusal of an interested reader. The conclusion we reach there is that the approach pursued in this paper is a non-trivial true weakening of the security notion discussed in [19] .
Conclusions
We have presented a general definition of opacity that extends previous work. This notion is no longer bound to the Petri net formalism and applies to any labelled transition system. However, restricting ourselves to initial opacity in the case of Petri nets allows us to find some decidability results. Furthermore, in this general model we can show how opacity relates to other information flow properties such as anonymity or non-inference.
Non-decidability results show that the opacity problem is a complex one. Its complexity is related to the complexity of the checked property, the complexity of the adversary's observational capabilities and the complexity of the system. The first point can be addressed by considering initial opacity which is still very expressive. The second one can be simplified by considering only m-orwellian observation functions. To solve the third problem, we can restrict ourselves to finite automata but this causes us to lose significant expressive power.
In the case of infinite Petri nets, over-and under-approximating gives a way of checking opacity. This technique works well in the case of our voting example. We intend in future work to find a better abstraction for Petri nets and some well suited abstractions for other formalisms.
Some of the work done within epistemic logic has been with a view to model checking (see [24, 28, 33] for recent examples). Automatic verification is also an important goal of our work, and so exploring the connections between epistemic logic and opacity should prove a strong basis for further research.
